Worked example
- requestId
- 45430134
- destination
- rpa8bBa8GS1Zit6y9PcpQbahkqFahpWMyb
- amount
- 9950000 drops
- XRPL result
- tesSUCCESS
- replay
- tefPAST_SEQ
- FDC
- VALID
- attestation
- none: the extension ran as a local process, not in a Confidential Space VM
Read-only, against live Coston2 and XRPL. A wallet is optional, and connecting one never implies you operate a FAssets agent.
Start here Eight steps. Nothing signs, nothing spends, and a wallet is optional throughout.
Everything here works without one. Connecting never implies you operate a FAssets agent.
Chain id 114. The header button switches, and offers to add the network if your wallet does not know it.
Signet's contracts are read from the chain below, byte count and all.
The only thing a caller ever supplies. One is filled in for you.
FAssets answers with the payment it requires, or a typed refusal. Both are useful.
Before authorizing, Signet checks independent endpoints for a payment already made.
Authorization, or a refusal with its reason code. No signature exists at this stage.
Every executed payment has a receipt anyone can re-check without trusting us.
There is no ninth step. Signet cannot authorize a payment from this console: no TEE machine is registered, so the FCC path stops before dispatch. That is the product's boundary, not the page's.
Read from deployments/coston2.json at build time, and re-checked live when scripting is on.
| Contract | Address | Live |
|---|---|---|
| SignetRegistry | 0x381bdE596169…cB877f6e | not checked |
| SignetInstructionSender | 0xd6cF30B6411D…30B4b9CA | not checked |
| SignetFccInstructionSender | 0x7e2dd9078c7d…0212963a | not checked |
| FlareTeeManager | 0x1a9C4A0f9D76…377618aE | not checked |
| AssetManagerFXRP | 0xc1ca88b937d0…6f4fbdfa | not checked |
Reads the canonical obligation from the deployed contract on Coston2. With scripting off, the worked example below shows exactly what it returns.
Before authorizing anything, Signet looks at the XRP ledger itself, across independently hosted endpoints that have to agree. This runs the same check from your browser.
Checks whether the payment behind the worked example is on the ledger, and whether independent endpoints tell the same story.
What the policy would answer for this obligation, and why. No signature exists at this stage, and none can: no TEE machine is registered.
An unavailable action is shown disabled with its reason rather than hidden.
| Action | Status | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Connect wallet | Real | Explicit click only, plain EIP-1193, no SDK. |
| Switch to Coston2 | Real | Chain id 114. |
| Read canonical obligation | Real | Where the request state permits it. |
| Inspect deployment | Real | Read-only contract code checks. |
| Observe XRPL | Real, read-only | Independent endpoints must agree. |
| Verify a receipt | Real | Runs in the repository, not the browser. |
| Deterministic attack demo | Simulation | Labelled, from a committed fixture. |
| Simulated FCC policy execution | Simulated | Local process, no TEE, labelled everywhere. |
| Hardware FCC authorization | Unavailable | No TEE machine. MachineManager owner admission required. |
| Operate as a whitelisted FAssets agent | Out of scope | Flare declined new agents; Signet holds no agent authority. |